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CHAPTER 6 
Commercial Law 
WILLIAM F. WILLIER 
§6.1. General. Views may diverge as to what judicial and legisla-
tive developments in the Commonwealth since the 1961 ANNUAL SUR-
VEY properly fall within the purview of "Commercial Law." Of those 
selected for this chapter and discussed below, it is at once apparent 
that the greatest flurry of activity dealt directly or indirectly with 
banks and related institutions. The trend in the General Court gen-
erally was to expand the powers of banks, trust companies and credit 
unions in the kinds and amounts of credit they could extend and the 
investments they could make.1 Decisions of the Supreme Judicial 
Court and the federal courts sitting in Massachusetts, three also in-
volving banks, three involving warranties in the sale of goods and 
others involving secured transactions, debts dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy and commercial paper, ranged from doubtful to superb. In 
only a few instances were the developments of significant interest to 
other than those who may have been immediately involved. These 
instances are accorded the most attention in the discussion that follows. 
§6.2. Banks and banking: Liability of collecting bank to drawer 
of check with forged indorsement. Whether a collecting bank is liable 
to the drawer of a check which did not reach the payee and upon 
which the payee's indorsement WitS forged was unsettled in Massachu-
setts law, and remained so with the enactment of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, until Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First Na-
tional Bank & Trust Co. of Greenfield 1 was decided in 1962. An 
employee of the drawer plaintiff, instead of sending the checks to the 
payee in payment of obligations of the drawer, forged the indorsement 
of the payee and "cashed" them with the defendant bank. In a well-
reasoned opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order sus-
taining the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint which 
contained counts for money had and received and for conversion. 
The Court gave a number of reasons for its holding, the most salient 
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of which were the fact that the plaintiff was not a holder to whom 
the checks were valuable property and to whom the drawee could 
make payment under Sections 1-201(20), 3-419 and 3-504 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code; the defendant had paid out its own funds 
and not the plaintiff's; if a conversion action lies, it is by the payee; 
the plaintiff had a right to have its account recredited by the drawee 
bank unless that bank had a defense and, if such a defense existed, 
that bank may have no right to recover over against the collecting 
bank. Thus, while seemingly preventing circuity of action, the rights 
of one party against another are not absolute or even upon the same 
bases. Several times the Court suggested that expediency would have 
been served had the drawee bank been made a party in order to settle 
the matter in a single suit among all parties.2 
Section 3-419(1)(c) of the Uniform: Commercial Code provides that 
an instrument is converted when it is "paid on a forged indorsement." 
The provision is ambiguous in determining to whom the liability in 
conversion runs. The Court is correct in holding that a drawer is not 
such a person since, while the check, for lack of delivery to the payee, 
remains the property of the drawer, there is no promissory obligation 
on the check running to the drawer. Technically, only the piece of 
paper is converted. The Court suggests, however, that if a payee has 
an action against a collecting bank, it is not by virtue of Section 3-419. 
In effect, the Court is construing the word "paid" in its technical 
sense, meaning final payment by the payor-drawee bank.3 The word 
could as well be construed to have its ordinary meaning of payment 
by any person, including "cashing" the check by a collecting bank. 
Subsections (2) and (3), limiting the liability "in conversion or other-
wise" of collecting banks to proceeds they still have, make this con-
struction logical. They also would preclude recovery in this case by 
even a payee to whom the check was delivered. 
A check with a forged payee's indorsement is not "properly payable" 
from the drawer-depositor's account, and the drawee-payor bank's lia-
bility is thus implicit in Section 4-401. The depositor is given three 
years from the time the item is made available to him with his bank 
statement to discover and report the forgery.4 However, the duty to 
use reasonable care and promptness in discovering and notifying the 
bank of forgery of his own signature or of a material alteration5 does 
not include forged indorsements. A payor bank may not recover from 
a collecting bank the amount of the item if it fails to assert a defense 
against its customer based upon breach of this duty.6 It is this syllo-
gism which militates against the drawer's recovery directly from the 
2 See U.C.C. §3-803, G.L., c. 106, §3-803, which allows "vouching in" of third 
parties who may be liable over. Further citations to the Uniform Commercial Code 
in this chapter are only to the U.C.C. citation. The section number thus cited is 
the same as that appearing in G.L., c. 106. 
3 See U.C.C. §4-213(1), which provides for when final payment occurs. 
4 U.C.C. §4-406(4). 
5 Id. §4-406( I). 
6Id. §4-406(5). 
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collecting bank as the party who will eventually bear the loss. The 
payor bank does not have an absolute right of recovery. This is the 
only case in which the Code would deny recovery by the payor bank, 
but does not preclude applying the reasoning to deny recovery by the 
drawer from the collecting bank in the case of a forged indorsement. 
In these cases, consistency and certainty are virtues. However, it is 
important to note that the Code itself does not preclude recovery by 
a payor bank from a presenting or transferring bank upon a breach 
of warranty for its failure to assert any other defense, such as negli-
gence contributing to an alteration or a forgery, against its customer. 
In this context, the rule of Section 4-406(5) should not be extended.7 
§6.3. Creditors' rights: Debts dischargeable in bankruptcy: As-
signee and trustee for benefit of creditors. Carmel Credit Union v. 
Lesser1 is more procedural than substantive in holding that mere 
admission by a plaintiff creditor that bankruptcy proceedings have 
been commenced, without pleading an exception to discharge under 
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, does not render the complaint de-
murrable. Discharge, as with the statute of limitations, is a matter 
of affirmative defense which, if raised, would only then require plead-
ing and proof of an exception. The plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendants in two companion actions had failed to list all of their debts 
in obtaining a loan from the plaintiff. Before the amendment to Sec-
tion 14 of the Bankruptcy Act,2 obtaining money by false representa-
tions was ground for denial of discharge. This is no longer true of 
a non-business bankrupt, but the money so obtained remains a non-
dischargeable debt under Section 17. The amendment was designed 
to give some relief to individual debtors duped by shrewd lenders and 
creditors into neglecting to list all creditors in applications for credit. 
The result of the amendment is to make the practice fashionable, 
since those who do not follow it will find their claims discharged while 
the more astute have protected themselves in this way. 
A depositary bank has a right to set off funds of the depositor 
against his obligations to the bank. This has not been true of un-
matured obligations except when insolvency proceedings by or against 
the debtor are commenced.s The Supreme Judicial Court in Fried-
man v. First National Bank of Boston4 put an assignment for the 
benefit of creditors on the same footing, holding that a bank could 
with impunity dishonor two checks of the depositor payable to the 
assignee under an assignment made six days prior and which were 
presented one day prior to the maturity date of the assignor's note 
7Id. §3-406. "Although the principle of subsection (5) might well be applied to 
other types of claims of customers against banks and defenses to these claims, the 
rule of the subsection is limited to defenses of a payor bank under this section. No 
present need is known to give the rule wider effect." u.Ge. §4-406, 1958 Official 
Comment. ' 
§6.3. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1121, 183 N.E.2d 725. 
2 Act of July 12, 1960, P.L. 621, 86th Cong., 74 Stat. 408. 
Sll U.S.C. §108 (1958), Bankruptcy Act §68. 
41962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1087,183 N.E.2d 722, also noted in §9.2 infra. 
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held by the bank. The bank knew of the assignment, its debt had 
not been listed by the assignor and its ability to collect had been 
jeopardized; hence the assignment of all assets to the assignee "gave 
the bank a right of set off." 
An assignment or trust for the benefit of creditors is a non-bank-
ruptcy device for liquidation of assets. Increasingly, the assignee is 
being placed in the same relationship vis-a-vis the debtor and his 
creditors as is the trustee in bankruptcy.5 Unless bankruptcy is to 
become the only available means of liquidation, this must be so. Had 
the bank precipitated bankruptcy in this case, its right of set-off would 
have been secure. Whether this is sound, since it results in a lawful 
preference, is a matter of policy which the Supreme Judicial Court 
properly did not reach. Implicit in the decision is that a creditor 
assenting to the assignment would not have the right of set-off.6 How-
ever, there is no reason to limit the right to banks as creditors: any 
creditor with mutual debts and credits should be allowed to set off 
the amount he owes. 
On the other hand, in the absence of statute, there are certain 
powers of the trustee in bankruptcy denied to an assignee. One of 
these is avoiding certain liens acquired within four months of the 
assignment.7 But neither trustee nor assignee succeeds to the rights 
of creditors with valid, enforceable liens. The Court in the Friedman 
case so held in denying the assignee's claim for funds held by the bank 
which creditors had previously reached by trustee process. 
The duties of trustees for the benefit of creditors were augmented 
by statute where the assets or liabilities of the assignor exceed $5000.8 
In addition to the obligations to give notice to creditors and to file 
publicly a copy of the assignment, in these cases the trustee must now, 
fifteen days before distribution of assets, furnish a statement of total 
assets of the trust with the assignee's affidavit that they comprise all 
of his property and estate, liabilities of the trust and all costs, fees 
and expenses. The effect of this amendment is indirect: failure to 
comply will subject the assignment to attack in insolvency proceedings 
as invalid and the trustee to possible personal accountability for the 
property or its proceeds under Section 40 of Chapter 203. 
§6.4. Retail instalment contracts: Charge for deferred payments 
under motor vehicle contracts and rebates for prepayment of service 
contracts. Two statutes were enacted during the 1962 SURVEY year 
further regulating instalment contracts for goods and services. One 
made a distinction between a renewal of the unpaid time balance and 
deferment of instalment payments under retail instalment contracts 
for the sale of motor vehicles.1 Former Section 17 of Chapter 255B 
had tended to treat them in the same manner. Actually, their effect 
Ii U.C.C. §9-301(3). 
6 See G.L., c. 203, §40. 
711 U.S.C. §107 (1958), Bankruptcy Act §67a. 
8 Acts of 1962, c. 52. 
§6.4. 1 Acts of 1962, c. 29l1. 
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is the same in most cases: extension of the time of payment under the 
initial contract. However, a renewal has to do with the entire unpaid 
balance, while deferment may apply to one or more instalments with-
out affecting the outside time for complete payment under the original 
contract. The means of recomputation of the finance charge upon 
the entire balance after credit for prepayment could not logically 
apply to deferments. Thus sellers or their assignees were discouraged 
from providing temporary relief from instalment obligations. 
The recomputation rule of Section 17 remains the same for re-
newals. However, holders may now collect a deferment charge of not 
more than one percent per month on each amount deferred from the 
date it was originally payable until it is payable under the deferment 
agreement. A minimum of one dollar may be charged in any case. 
In the case of neither renewal nor deferment is it clear what sort of 
writing, if any, is required. Ostensibly, renewal involves a completely 
new instalment contract, and compliance with the formalities of Sec-
tions 9-13 of Chapter 255B so far as possible is at least implicitly con-
templated. To defer payments, something more than tacit assent to 
a late payment would seem to be required. The deferment charge 
is not a delinquency charge,2 but an additional charge for overtly 
extending the credit period. The limitation on the period for which 
the additional charge may be made uses the term "agreement," some-
thing short of a new instalment contract but more than a waiver of 
delinquent payments. The agreement wisely should be reduced to 
writing with the essential terms of the deferment. 
Since 1955 purchasers of consumer goods on instalment credit have 
been assured of the right to prepay the indebtedness in advance and 
to receive a credit for or rebate of finance charges computed by the 
sum of digits or "Rule of 78" method.s The statute did not cover 
contracts solely for service and may not have covered services rendered 
in connection with the instalment sale of consumer goods. Section 
12D has now been added to Chapter 255, and allows prepayment and 
credit for finance charges computed in the same manner "in any trans-
action for services rendered or to be rendered to a retail consumer 
for personal, family or household purposes." 4 It seems clear that this 
provision applies (I) to services in connection with an instalment sale 
of goods and (2) to services alone provided on instalment credit. 
There are two limitations: the debtor must be a retail consumer, and 
the services must be for personal, family or household purposes. These 
would exclude services rendered to the business debtor. However, the 
types of services which meet the limitations are many. They range 
from the overhaul and repair of watches, washing machines and fur-
naces to the application of siding to or installation of a dormer upon 
a private dwelling. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that "services" alone 
or in conjunction with a security interest in consumer goods are not 
2 G.L., c. 2MB, §ll. 
SId. §12B. 
4 Acts of 1962, c. lI09. 
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included in the statutes regulating the contents of the agreement,1I re-
stricting the kinds and amounts of collateral,6 and requiring that notes 
be labeled "Consumer Note" preventing acquisition by holders in due 
course.7 The possible abuses in instalment service contracts are as 
great as in instalment transactions with goods.s 
§6.5. Sales: Breach of contract and breach of warranty. Three 
cases, all decided by federal courts, involved breach of sales contracts 
and breach of warranty. The decision in each case turned upon proof 
offered by the plaintiff buyer. Ordinarily, that fact would mitigate 
against any broader significance, but it is precisely that fact that war-
rants their inclusion and comparison here. In Skopes Rubber Corp. 
v. United States Rubber CO.1 both sides had carefully and thoroughly 
presented evidence going to the establishment of the contract for sale 
of a vinyl-coated rubber product for use in skin-diving suits, of a war-
ranty by sample as part of the contract and of a breach of both. The 
Court of Appeals reversed a lower court decision directing a verdict 
for the defendant seller, holding that the evidence was sufficient for 
a jury determination of the issues. By contrast, Judge Caffery gave 
judgment for the seller in both D'Orsay Equipment Co. v. United 
States Rubber CO.2 and Belanger Sons} Inc. v. Fry Roofing co.a when 
the buyer in each case failed to produce evidence sufficient to support 
its claims. The Uniform Sales Act and not the Uniform Commercial 
Code governed all three cases. The moral for counsel is that the 
courts are reading the statutes carefully and are requiring careful ad-
herence in the proof required to meet them. The moral goes one 
step further: counsel must advise the client wisely in procedure to be 
followed long before the dispute reaches the courts in which that prior 
conduct will determine the eventual outcome. 
In the Skopes case, the buyer, whether on advice or not, gave im-
mediate notice to the seller when the material eventually received 
failed to meet the elaborate tests of the original sample.4 In D'Orsay} 
the buyer notified the seller of alleged defects five months after it re-
ceived the first complaint from a customer, while the statute required 
notice within a reasonable time and the parties' contract required 
thirty days' notice.1I Inadequate evidence of causal connection be-
tween the damage suffered and the ill-proved defects in a waterproof-
ing substance helped defeat the buyer in Belanger Sons} Inc.;6 in 
Skopes} the testimony was long and detailed on this issue.7 The plain-
II G.L.. c. 255. §12. 
6Id. §13B. 
7 Id. §12C. 
S See Model Retail Instalment Sales Act. 11 B.C. Ind. Be Comm. L. Rev. 4117 (1962). 
§6.5. 1299 F.2d 584 (1st Cir. 1962). 
2199 F. Supp. 427 (D. Mass. 1961). 
s 201 F. Supp. 171 (D. Mass. 1962). 
4299 F.2d 584. 590 (1st Cir. 1962). 
11199 F. Supp. 427. 432 (D. Mass. 1961). 
6201 F. Supp. 171. 173 (D. Mass. 1962). 
7299 F.2d 584. 592·593 (1st Cir. 1962). 
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tiff in the Skopes case produced both documentary and oral evidence 
of the lengthy negotiations, conferences and agreements of the parties 
toward establishing both the contract and the warranty; the plaintiff 
in the D'Orsay case chose to ignore a prior contract, the terms of which, 
including delivery and price, were adhered to in the contract in dis-
pute, because other terms disclaimed warranties and limited remedies.s 
The comparison could be extended. Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code reflects draftsmanship sensitive to commercial needs and 
understanding. The requirements for complying with its terms be-
fore and at the time, during performance, and after breach of a con-
tract for sale are no more than buyers and sellers should expect. The 
court in the Skopes case was able to find evidence of a warranty by 
sample sufficient to send to a jury,9 distinguishing a prior case in which 
it was said that the buyer's hope had exceeded the result but no ex-
press warranty that the hope would be fulfilled had been made.10 This 
is, perhaps, a fine distinction, but illustrative of distinctions that must 
be made in fact. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a buyer must 
establish that there was an affirmation or promise, as opposed to a 
hope, which became a basis of the bargain in order to establish an 
express warranty.11 
§6.6. Secured transactions: Assignment of contract rights and ac-
counts. After reading the lengthy and complex opinion in Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Harvard Trust Co.,1 decided on the basis of 
pre-Code law, the commercial lawyer must breathe a sigh of relief for 
the comparatively simple provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. The events all began in 1954 when a bank orally agreed 
to extend a $200,000 line of credit to a contractor, each advance of 
which was to be secured by assignments of "all the proceeds" from 
specific accounts receivable for work performed under the contracts 
financed. Until February 3, 1958, the bank made substantial loans 
to the contractor, allowed him to deposit the money in his usual 
checking account and to use it freely, and accepted checks drawn upon 
the account in payment of the loans. During this time, five of the 
contracts were with the United States and one was with the city of 
Cambridge. The contractor applied for and obtained performance 
bonds on the federal contracts as required by the Assignment of Claims 
Act. Each application assigned to the surety the contractor's contract 
rights against the Government, and each assignment was to secure 
payment to the surety upon the contractor's default under the other 
contracts and bonds. Neither bank nor surety gave notice of the assign-
ments to the Government or to each other, although the surety knew 
that the bank was financing the contractor. 
As each advance was made by the bank, the contractor signed a col-
S 199 F. Supp. 427, 430 (D. Mass. 1961). 
9299 F.2d 584, 591 (1st Cir. 1962). 
10 Egyptian Chemical Co. v. General Products Co., 229 F.2d 263 (1st Cir. 1956). 
11 See U.C.C. §2-3U. 
§6.6. 11962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 569, 181 N.E.2d 673, also noted in §9.4 infra. 
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lateral note and assigned book accounts evidenced by invoices. The 
contractor's books were marked to reflect the assignment to the bank. 
Money advanced by the bank was not used exclusively for the con-
tracts involved. 
Between November 30, 1956, when all prior indebtedness had been 
paid, and February 3, 1958, the bank advanced $981,000 and received 
in payments a total of $433,269. On February 3, the bank learned 
of the assignment to the surety, of the contractor's default under the 
Government contracts and, so it contended, of the requirement of 
notice under the Assignment of Claims Act. The contractor and bank 
executed proper assignments under the act on February 10, and the 
bank received from the contractor two additional payments on Feb-
ruary 3 and 11. The surety took all further payments by agreement 
with the bank and then sought to recover all payments received by 
the bank prior to that time. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held, upon facts found by a master, 
that the surety could recover only the payments made after February 3 
before which the bank had no notice of the assignment to the surety 
which, by the contractor's default, had become unconditional. Reach-
ing this result required consideration of many pre-Code cases and 
some often nebulous distinctions. The Court rejected as reasons the 
failure of the surety to notify the bank and the fact that the bank's 
advances reduced the surety's risks. The significant fact was the actual 
receipt of payment by the bank before notice. Until the default of 
the contractor, the surety's rights were "inchoate" and merely equita-
ble, whether acquired by assignment or by subrogation. 
The Uniform Commercial Code would make the result somewhat 
easier and somewhat different. In the first place, the oral agreement 
between the bank and the contractor could have no efficacy under 
Section 9-203(1), which requires a written security agreement. No 
doubt the subsequent collateral notes, if they created or provided for 
the security interest in the contract rights or accounts, or the formal 
assignments themselves, or both together, would constitute security 
agreements. By contrast, the written applications for bonds which 
assigned the contract rights to the surety, even though the obligation 
secured was conditional upon the contractor's default, were security 
agreements adequate under the Code. At the time of the suit, neither 
party had perfected his security interest which, in the case of accounts 
and contract rights, can only be accomplished by filing financing state-
ments in the proper office or offices.2 Thus the rule of priority as to the 
accounts or contract rights themselves is found in Section 9-312(5)(c): 
" ... [PJriority between conflicting security interests in the same col-
lateral shall be determined ... (c) in the order of attachment under 
Section 9-204(1) so long as neither is perfected." Notice of assignment 
to the Government under the Miller Act is not an act of perfection, but 
does insure payment directly from the Government to the assignee and, 
had the bank complied at once, the surety would have been notified of 
2 U.C.C. §9-302. 
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the assignment to the bank at least giving it knowledge of the claim. It 
is difficult to believe that the bank, financing contractors with the Gov-
ernment in such large sums, was ignorant of the requirements of the 
act. 
It must be assumed that the application for and issuance of the 
bond preceded both the consummation of the contract and the formal 
assignments to the bank in exchange for advances that occurred only 
after the contract existed. If this is so, the surety's security interest 
attached to the contract rights immediately upon execution of the con-
tracts3 and to the accounts upon performance by the contractor, while 
the bank's could not attach until the assignments (security agreements) 
were executed.4 However, when the contractor received the proceeds 
and they were commingled freely, the security interest of either party, 
extending to only identifiable proceeds and to those only ten days after 
receipt, was 10st.1I At best, the payments to the bank before February 
3 were mere preferences not unlike, as against the surety, payments 
to any other creditor. 
After February 3, when the bank learned of the surety's claim, if 
the proceeds under the contracts had not been received and remained 
identifiable, the surety would be entitled to them as the holder of the 
first attaching security interest in the accounts or contract rights. If, 
on the other hand, the payments to the bank on February 6 and 11 
were from the contractor's commingled cash in his account, they would 
be no different from the prior payments. Notice of the surety's claim 
has no bearing on priorities. Instead of notice, the surety should have 
acquired a lien upon the contractor's bank account and, to be secure 
as to future proceeds, filed a financing statement covering both the 
contract rights and proceeds. Even at that late date, the surety would 
prevail as the first to perfect. It is safe to say that neither sureties nor 
banks will be so naive in future transactions with contractors. 
§6.7. Secured transactions: Knowledge of contents of financing 
statements. A conditional seller of machinery filed financing state-
ments with the Secretary of the Commonwealth and the Register of 
Deeds for Bristol County, but none with the city clerk of Attleboro, 
where the buyer-debtor had its only place of business. The trustee in 
bankruptcy of the debtor sold the machinery, and the referee denied 
the petition of the conditional seller to establish a lien on the pro-
ceeds. In affirming, the federal district court held in In the Matter 
of Babcock Box CO.I that the security interest was unperfected as 
required by Section 9-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code and hence 
was subordinate to the rights of a trustee in bankruptcy as a lien credi-
tor under Section 9-301(1) and (3). The court held that even though 
the conditional seller had filed in good faith and the trustee in bank-
ruptcy knew of the contents of the financing statement, he was still 
8 Id. §9·204(2)(c). 
4Id. §§9·203(1)(b), 9·204(1). 
II Id. §9·306(2)(3). 
~6.7. 1200 F. Supp. 80 (D. Mass. 1961). 
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a lien creditor without knowledge since all creditors did not have 
knowledge as provided in Sections 9-40 I (2) and 9-30 I (3). The court 
also held that the result would be the same under Section 70c of the 
Bankruptcy Act, which gives the trustee the status of the ideal lien 
creditor, meaning one without knowledge. 
The construction of the Uniform Commercial Code sections cited 
is probably correct, although not inevitable. Nothing directly con-
nects the definition of lien creditor in subsection (3) of Section 9-301 
and the effectiveness of filed financing statements the contents of which 
are known to the contesting third party provided in subsection (2) of 
Section 9-401. The former deals with knowledge of the security in-
terest, while the latter deals with knowledge of the contents of a financ-
ing statement. More important, however, is the court's indication 
that the status of the trustee under Section 70c is independent of the 
status given him by Article 9, but that the two shall be found con-
sistent wherever possible. Thus, assuming all creditors in bankruptcy 
knew of the security interest and their knowledge is imputed to the 
trustee by the Code provision, there is no basis for concluding that 
he will be held to have that knowledge as a lien creditor under Sec-
tion 70e. 
10
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